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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
of religion so that it could avoid the first amenment question of
whether Congress can constitutionally exempt consciousious ob-
jectors from military service."s
Robert R. Fredeking, 11
9 It must be pointed out that there is a constitutional question involved
in the conscientious objection cases. Section 6 () of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act does not exempt nonreligious conscientious objectors;
consequently it could be argued that it discriminates between different forms
of religious expression in violation of the first amendment's establishment and
free exercise clauses and the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See
Laurie, Conscientious Objection-Some Constitutional Questions, 73 W. VA. L.
REV. 138 (1971).
Emient Domain-De Facto Taking
Defendant was notified that its property was in an area to be
condemned for urban renewal. The proposed condemnation was
initiated in 1954 but postponed until 1967, at which time defen-
dant's property was formally condemned under the authority of a
provision of the New York General Municipal Law, which author-
izes a city to condemn property for urban renewal projects. During
the interim the project was highly publicized; as a result, proper-
ty in the area came into disrepair causing property values to de-
crease appreciably. Defendant was ordered to move from its pro-
perty, which it did in April, 1963. By the time defendant moved its
property had become unsalable and unrentable, but defendant con-
tinued to maintain it, pay taxes and carry insurance on it. The trial
court held the city's actions constituted a de facto taking of defen-
dan's property at the time defendant vacated it in 1963, and that
defendant should be reimbursed for its expenses in maintaining the
property until acquired by plaintiff in 1967. Held modified and af-
firmed. The condemning authority's actions so interferred with
the defendant's use and ownership of the property that the essen-
tial elements of ownership were destroyed and a de facto taking
occurred even though there was no physical invasion or legal
'N.Y. GEaN. MuN. LAw § 555 (McKinney Supp. 1970) amending N.Y. GEiN.
MuN. LAW § 555 (McKinney 1965) provides:
Real property or any interest therein. . .. necessary for or inci-
dental to any urban xenewal program or part thereof in accordance
with an urban renewal plan may be acquired by an agency by gift,
grant, devise, purchase, condemnation or otherwise and by a munici-
pality for and on behalf of an agency by condemnation. Property may
be acquired by condemnation by an agency or by a municipality for an
agency pursuant to the condemnation law or pursauant to the laws
relating to the condemnation of land by the municipality for which
the agency is acting or the municipality, as the case may be.
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restrain on the property. City of Buffalo v. J. W. Clement Co., 34
App. Div. 2d 24, 311 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1970).
As a general rule, a taking occurs when a party with the power
of eminent domain enters land with the intention to appropri-
ate it. When there has been no physical invasion of the property,
a taking occurs when title passes to the condemnor. 2 However, a
taking may occur when governmental action is so complete as to
deprive the owner of the indicia of ownership, use, and enjoy-
ment of the property.3 The Clement Court had to determine
whether a de facto taking had occurred in the absence of a physical
invasion of the property or a direct legal restraint upon its use.
The court first considered what constitutes a taking in a
constitutional sense.4 The court referred to the cases of United
States v. General Motors Corp.5 and Forster v. Scott.y The latter
case held that a taking occurs when governmental action "deprives
the owner of the beneficial use and free enjoyment of his property,
or imposes restraints upon such use and enjoyment that materially
affect its value, without legal process or compensation, it deprives
him of his property within the meaning of the constitution.."T
In this type of case the court in Clement said that a distinction
must be made between those cases which allow the condemnee to
establish damages using the value of his property before depression
by the threat of the impending condemnation and those cases in
which the condemnor's actions constitute a de facto taking prior to
formal condemnation. While the court noted this distinction, it is
difficult to apply it to earlier New York cases finding a de facto
taking. In City of Buffalo v. Strozzis a de facto taking was found
when the city adopted a resolution to condemn property under an
urban renewal plan, but had not commenced formal condemnation
proceedings. No mention was made as to whether the de facto tak-
ing actually constituted a taking for which compensation would
then be due or was merely the point at which reference would be
2 Department of Pub. Works v. Wolf, 414 Ill. 886, 111 N. E.2d 322 (1953);
In re Northern Pipe Line Co., 182 Pa. Super. 406, 1 A.2d 526 (1988).
3 United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); Southern
Counties Gas Co. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 934 (Ct. C1. 1958).
4 N.Y. CONsr. art. I, § 7 provides: "Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation." Both the W. VA. CoNsr. art. III, § 9
and the fifth amendment of the Unied States Constitution are virtually the
same.
5 325 U.S. 373 (1945).
6 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893).
7Id. at 584, 32 N.E. at 977.
s 54 Misc. 2d 1031, 283 N.Y.S.2d 919 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
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made to ascertain damages when the property was formally taken.
It appears the court had the latter meaning in mind as it allowed
no extra compensation to reimburse the owner for his expenses
from the time of the so-called de facto taking, as was done in Cle-
ment.9
In In re 572 Warren Street o the condemning authority served
notice of an intent to condemn and also sent letters to tenants ad-
vising them to move from the building. By the time of the formal
condemnation the building had very little value, having been
practically destroyed by vandals after the tenants moved out. The
court held that damages were to be computed at the time of the
condemnor's act when the building was fully rented and that a
de facto taking occurred at that time. Although the Court's lan-
guage was vague, it did award interest on the amount determined
from the time of the de facto taking. It may have considered the
condemnor's acts to constitute a taking rather than a mere point
of time at which to estimate compensation.
In the post-Clement case of New York State Electric & Gas
Corp. v. Meredith," the court again held that a de facto taking oc-
curred prior to the legal taking. This holding is distinguishable
from Clement in that the condemnor in Meredith actually took
and used the property prior to formal condemnation. The court
said when the condemnor's actions are such that a de facto taking
occurs the rights of the parties are fixed at that time; and the pass-
age of title in a subsequent condemnation proceding merely marks
the time at which payment is due.
The dissent in Clement relied upon Niagara Frontier Building
Corp. v. State12 and Cicci v. State'8 in finding that there were no
acts which would constitute a de facto taking. In Niagara the court
held that there was no de facto taking and further that there could
be no recovery for the mere manifestation of an intention to con-
9 See In re Town of Hempstead, 58 Misc. 2d 134, 294 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct.
1968). The court did not specify any action of the condemning authority which
constituted a de facto taking; nor did it discuss any reasons to justify such a
taking.
10 58 Misc. 2d 1073, 298 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
31 63 Misc. 2d 819, 313 N.Y.S.2d 216 (Sup. Ct. 1970). Plaintiff condemnor
sought to amend the judgment of a condemnation proceeding to give the defen-
dant a less restrictive easement, which would have allowed the condemnor's entry
on the property. Plaintiff alleged that title to the property did not pass until a
final judgment is entered in condemnation proceedings; therefore, if the judg-
ment were amended title to the property would be in defendant. The court
held that title had passed earlier because of plaintiff's physical invasion and
subsequent use of the property.
S83 App. Div. 2d 130, 305 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1969).
13 31 App. Div. 2d 733, 297 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1968).
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demn or for a threat to condemn. The condemnor's only action in
that case was the issuance of a letter expressing an intention to con-
demn. The letter had been sent to one of the tenants in the con-
demnee's building and was subsequently shown to the condemnee,
who ordered all tenants to vacate the building and closed it. No
other acts were committed by the state; therefore there was no
de facto taking. However, in determining compensation at the
formal condemnation proceedings, the court held the value of the
property less the debilitating effect of the threat of condemna-
tion was the proper measure of damages. In Cicci the appellate
division overruled a trial court finding of de facto taking and held
that there could be no taking absent entry on the property or an
ouster of possession. The only action prior to condemnation was
the revocation of a driveway permit. The dissent in Clement also
relied upon City of Buffalo v. George Irish Paper Co.," contend-
ing that there was no de facto taking. The majority in Clement
properly placed that case among those allowing compensation to be
measured in light of the value-depressing acts of the condemnor.
Other jurisdictions have recognized a de facto taking caused by
action of a condemning authority which deprives a property own-
er of the use and enjoyment of his property. The much cited case
of In re Elmwood Park'1 recognized a de facto taking caused by
the threat of condemnation. The Michigan court said, "[A] city
may not by deliberate acts reduce the value of private property
and thereby deprive the owner of just compensation."'' 1 The court
held that the city's reduction of general services in the area to be
condemned did not constitute a de facto taking but that certain
other acts17 would have that effect. Another case reaching the same
result is Foster v. City of Detroit's which held the condemnor's
actions, "which substantially contributed to and accelerated the
decline in value of plaintiffs' property constituted a 'taking' of
plaintiffs' property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment,
for which compensation must be paid."' 9 These decisions were fol-
14 26 N.Y.2d 869, 309 N.Y.S2d 606, 258 N.E.2d 100 (1970) aff'g 31 App. Div.
470, 299 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1969).
15 376 Mich. 311, 186 N.W.2d 896 (1965).
28 Id. at 317, 136 N.W.2d at 900.
17 Id. The acts mentioned by the court were the sending of letters to ten-
ants advising them of the impending condemnation, the filing of lis pendens,
intense building code inspections and issuance of citations for violations, and
the refusal to permit a long established business to continue in a building be-
cause it was to be condemned.
18 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966) affd 405 F.2d. 138 (6th Cir. 1968).
'Did. at 665-66.
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lowed in Madison Realty Co. v. City of Detroit.20 In Elmwood Park,
Foster, and Madison Realty Co., the courts allowed the property
owner extra compensation for maintaining the property from the
time of de facto taking to the time of legal taking, which would
imply that title, in effect, passed at the time of the de facto tak-
ing and all that remained was the payment of just compensation.
Past decisions by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals on this subject are contrary to Clement. West Virginia has
a statutory provision which provides that taking under eminent
domain proceedings is complete when the condemnor pays the
assessed compensation into court.2' The leading West Virginia case
on the point is Buchannon & N. R.R. v. Great Scott Coal & Coke
Co. 2 The court in that case construed a section of the Code of
1913, idential to the present section, and said, "[T]he date of the
actual taking of the land is the date when, after the report of the
commissioners ... or after verdict, if a jury is demanded, the money
is actually paid to the owner, or into court. Until then the appli-
cant is not permitted to put a foot on the ground." 23 The court
also held compensation for property taken by eminent domain is
determined as of the date of the taking. These rules have been
followed by the court on numerous occasions.24
Of course, a direct invasion of private property by a condemn-
ing authority without payment is a taking.25 "Property is taken,
within the constitutional meaning, where it is materially impaired
by something more than mere consequential injury, and which
impairment renders it impossible for the owner to enjoy his pro-
perty to the full extent to which he is entitled."26 The court went
further in Fruth v. Board of Affairs,- noting that an act by the
20 315 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
21 W. VA. CODE ch. 54, art. 2, § 12 (Michie 1966) provides:
[A]t any time within three months after the report, or the ver-
dict of the jury . . . has been confirmed and ordered to be
recorded, the sum so ascertained with legal interest thereon
from the date of the report or verdict until payment, may be
paid by the applicant into court; upon such payment, title to
the property, or interest or right therein, so paid for shall be
absolutely vested in the applicant....
75 W. VA. 423, 83 S.E. 1031 (1914).
23 Id. at 431, 83 S.E. at 1034.
24E.g., State Road Comm'n v. Darrah, 151 W. Va. 509, 153 S.E.2d 408
(1967); State Road Comm'n v. Ferguson, 148 W. Va. 742, 137 S.E.2d 206 (1964);
State ex rel. Wells v. City of Dunbar, 142 W. Va. 332, 95 S.E.2d 457 (1956);
Cresapeake & 0. Ry. v. Johnson, 137 W. Va. 19, 69 S.E.2d 393 (1952); Strouds
C. & M. R. R. v. Herold, 131 W. Va. 45, 45 S.E.2d 513 (1947).
25 65 W. Va. 739, 65 S.E. 196 (1909).
2 Id. at 743, 65 S.E. at 198.
27 75 W. Va. 456, 460-61, 84 S.E. 105, 108 (1915).
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state or a municipality which "substantially interferes" with the
owner's use and ownership of his property is a taking of such pro-
perty without compensation and is prohibited by the West Virginia
constitution.
The New York court in Clement noted that, in general courts
have been reluctant to find a problem of a de facto taking. The
court reasoned that this is probably because the problem has not
often arisen. Today's widespread urban renewal projects and
modern highway construction promise more and more de facto
taking cases. At present the problem is not of great magnitude in
West Virginia, though it may increase in the future. The West
Virginia court might well look to Clement in fashioning a modem
rule to provide appropriate relief to prevent serious injustice in
situations involving the wholesale appropriation of property by
eminent domain.
James M. Henderson, 11
Income Tax-Stock Redemption:
"Essentially Equivalent To A Dividend"
In 1945 taxpayer and E. B. Bradley organized a corporation.
In exchange for property contributions, Bradley received five hun-
dred shares of common stock and taxpayer and his wife each receiv-
ed two hundred fifty shares. Taxpayer later purchased an addi-
tional one thousand shares of preferred stock at a par value of
twenty-five dollars per share in order for the company to qualify
for a federal loan, the corporation agreeing to redeem the pre-
ferred stock when the loan had been repaid. Before the redemption,
taxpayer bought Bradley's five hundred shares and divided them
between his son and daughter. Then in 1963, when the corpora-
tion redeemed the preferred stock, taxpayer, in his personal income
tax return, did not report the twenty-five thousand dollars received
by him as income. "Rather, taxpayer considered the redemption
as a sale of his preferred stock to the company-a capital gain trans-
action under section 802 of the Internal Revenue Code resulting in
no tax since taxpayer's basis in the stock equaled the amount he
received for it."', The Commissioner disagreed with this and took
'United States v. Davis, 90 S. Ct. 1041, 1043 (1970). INT. Rrv. CODE OF
1954, § 302 provides that a redemption of stock by a corporation shall he treat-
ed as a distribution in part or full payment in exchange for the stock thus
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